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Introduction
From a general equilibrium point of view, the analysis of finite-horizon economies with heterogeneous agents has been extended to an infinite horizon introducing either households with an infinite lifetime (see, for instance, Magill and Quinzii (1994) and Hernandez and Santos (1996) ) or overlapping generations of finitely-lived agents (as in Schmachtenberg (1988) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991) ).
In these models, altruistic motives had appeared as polar cases of our real world behavior. While finitely-lived agents are interpreted as totally selfish individuals, infinitely-lived households are considered as dynasties of finitely-lived generations, that care about their descendants as much as they care about themselves.
Thus, we want to consider agents' altruistic behavior in a more realistic manner, allowing for wealth transfers, such as donations and bequests. Actually, although the importance of these types of transfers was extensively highlighted by economic research on capital accumulation, social security systems or public deficits, 1 the analysis of donations and bequests, in a general equilibrium context, still remains incomplete.
In other side, all the models cited above assume that agents' lifetimes are deterministic and assets are free of default. In addition, when individuals are infinitely-lived, the successive postponements of their commitments, through the appeal to new credits -Ponzi schemes -were ruled out using exogenous debt constraints or transversality conditions. Models with finitely-lived agents assume that individuals do not have access to credit markets at their terminal dates, as there are no mechanisms to assure that debts, made at the end of life, will be repaid.
These assumptions, which are strong simplifications of the financial markets practices, restrict agents' behavior and do not follow from individual rationality. In fact, as pointed out in economic research, decisions about allocation of consumption or determination of amounts for savings and bequests are strongly affected by the expected life duration. 2 Furthermore, in the real world, agents can have access to credit markets along their entire life and, in some contingencies, borrowers do not honor their promises.
Thus, we also want to address, in a general equilibrium framework, the actual market practices that allow agents to get loans, even when lifetimes are uncertain and assets are subject to default.
In this direction, when agents are infinitely-lived, commodities are durable and assets are collateralized, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) show equilibrium existence, without imposing debt constraints or transversality conditions to avoid Ponzi schemes. Moreover, in a similar framework, Kubler and Schmedders (2003) prove that collateral rationalizes tight borrowing limits in computational stationary equilibria. In this paper, we show that collateral also plays a crucial role when agents' lifetimes are uncertain. Indeed, the existence of physical guarantees creates a natural form to allow agents to make promises at all nodes of their life span, without introducing any exogenous credit constraint.
More precisely, we develop a model in which lifetimes are uncertain and physical bundles of durable commodities can be used to collateralize assets. Moreover, since individuals may have physical and financial wealths left over when they pass away, we introduce some mechanisms to regulate wealth reallocations.
First, agents can write wills in order to determine their bequests. Second, each individual can make nominal donations during his lifetime. In particular, an agent can make donations to disinherit some agents who will have legal rights over his estate when he passes away.
An agent's debt will be paid by his estate before beneficiaries of his testament receive their bequests. Moreover, when an agent's estate is not totally distributed after both the payments of his 1 For instance, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) observe that nearly four-fifths of U.S. wealth accumulation is due to intergenerational transfers. Fuster (2000) proved, in a model where the lifetime durations are affected by uncertainty, that aggregate savings and the enhancement of capital accumulation depend on the bequest motive. In addition, Cardia and Michel (2004) show that capital is an increasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism.
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See, for instance, Leung (1994) , Fuster (1999) , Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2002) and d 'Albis (2006) .
debts and the delivery of his bequests, his intestate estate 3 will be divided among his heirs according to rules determined by exogenous inheritance laws.
In addition to utility benefits from consumption, agents may receive, according to their degree of altruism, utility gains from both the amount of their donations and the structure of their testamentary rights. Consequently, unlike the classical Overlapping Generations model in which individuals are totally selfish, agents may be interested in purchasing financial assets even at their terminal nodes, in order to increase the value of their estate and, therefore, assure higher transfers for those agents who will hold testamentary rights. Note that, selfish agents may also leave accidental bequests to their heirs as lifetimes are uncertain.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we present the model. The assumptions and our equilibrium existence results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to some examples of bequest functions illustrating how optimal testamentary transfers may vary as functions of agents' wealth. Finally, we make some comments on the optimal level of donations and we discuss some possible extensions of our analysis. Proofs are given in the Appendices.
The model
Stochastic structure. The stochastic structure is described by an infinite event-tree with a unique root. There is a countable set of time periods, {0, 1, . . .}, and there is no uncertainty at t = 0. Thus, denoting by s 0 the unique state of nature at the first period, we suppose that given a history of realization of uncertainty s t = (s 0 , . . . , s t−1 ), there exists a finite set S(s t ) of states of nature at period t. An information set ξ = (t, s t , s), where t 1 and s ∈ S(s t ), is called a node of the economy.
Let ξ 0 be the initial node, at t = 0. The set of nodes in the economy is called the event-tree and is denoted by D.
We refer to the nodes ξ = (t, s t , s), with t 1, as successors of ξ 0 . Moreover, given ξ = (t, s t , s) and µ = (t , s t , s ), we say that µ is a successor of ξ, and we write µ ξ, if both t t 1 and (s t , s ) = (s t , s, . . . ). Let t(ξ) = t be the period associated to ξ = (t, s t , s) and let ξ − be its (unique) predecessor, that is, ξ − ξ and t(ξ − ) = t(ξ) − 1. Now, we denote by ξ + : {µ ∈ D : µ ξ, t(µ) = t(ξ) + 1} the set of immediate successors of ξ. Finally, let D(ξ) = {µ ∈ D : µ ξ} be the set of successors of ξ, and
Demographic structure and physical markets. Letting I be the set of agents in the economy, the set of nodes at which an agent i ∈ I can trade is denoted by D i ⊂ D. Thus, we allow lifetime durations to be affected by uncertainty. Note that, the traditional overlapping generations model and the infinitely-lived households model can be obtained as particular cases of our demographic structure.
Let I(ξ) := {i ∈ I : ξ ∈ D i } be the non-empty set of agents who are alive at node ξ ∈ D. We suppose that the number, n(ξ) := #I(ξ), of agents who are alive at ξ is finite. When the set D i is finite, agent i is said to be finitely-lived. Otherwise, agent i will have at least one infinite-life path through the event-tree.
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When a valid will (or testament) has been made, but only applies to part of the estate, the remaining wealth forms the intestate estate. Without loss of generality, we assume that agents do not exit the economy at a given node and reappear afterward on the markets. That is, for each
At each node, there is a finite ordered set, G, of physical goods that are traded on spot markets by the alive consumers. Let p = (p(ξ); ξ ∈ D) be the commodity price process, where p(ξ) = (p(ξ, g); g ∈ G) ∈ R G + \ {0} denotes the spot price of commodities at ξ. Each agent i has an endowment process
and chooses a consumption plan
, where x i (ξ) ∈ R G + denotes the consumption bundle at node ξ.
A plan x i gives a utility level U i (x i ), where the function
Commodities may be durable and suffer depreciation. The depreciation structure is given by a
, with non-negative entries. So, when agent i uses the services of a bundle
To simplify notations, agent i's accumulated endowment up to node ξ ∈ D i will be denoted by
Financial markets. At each ξ ∈ D, there is a finite ordered set, J(ξ), of one-period real assets, available for inter-temporal transaction and insurance. As in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) , assets are subject to default and backed by physical collateral requirements.
More precisely, an asset j ∈ J(ξ) is characterized by a vector of real promises A(µ, j) ∈ R G + , at each µ ∈ ξ + , and by a vector of unitary collateral requirements C(ξ, j) ∈ R G + , which is held and consumed by the borrowers for each unit of asset j that they sold at ξ.
be the financial price process, where q(ξ) = (q(ξ, j); j ∈ J(ξ)) denotes the asset price vector at ξ. The set of state-contingent assets in the economy is denoted by
As the unique enforcement in case of default is the seizure of collateral guarantees, a seller i of one unit of j ∈ J(ξ) at ξ ∈ D i , pays at each immediate successor µ ∈ ξ + ∩ D i , the minimum between the depreciated value of the collateral and the original promises;
Moreover, since promises are backed by physical collateral, agent i is allowed to sell assets at any node of his life span. More precisely, given ξ ∈ D i , we suppose, as explained hereafter, that, at each node µ ∈ ξ + \ D i , the market seizes the collateral requirements and delivers the difference between the collateral value and the original promise, made at ξ, to individuals who have testamentary or inheritance rights over agent i's estate.
On the other hand, although financial transactions are anonymous, each lender knows that the unique enforcement in case of default is the seizure of the constituted collateral. In addition, we assume that each lender believes that (i) borrowers are rational and are aware of the market rules in case of default, and (ii) all agents in the economy have monotonic preferences. Thus, each buyer i of one unit of asset j ∈ J(ξ), expects to receive, at each µ ∈ ξ + , the amount R µ,j (p(µ)).
Let us denote by θ i (ξ) = (θ i (ξ, j); j ∈ J(ξ)) and by ϕ i (ξ) = (ϕ i (ξ, j); j ∈ J(ξ)), respectively, the long and short positions of agent i at ξ ∈ D i . When agent i chooses a financial process ( 
where R µ (p(µ)) := (R µ,j (p(µ)); j ∈ J(ξ)). Moreover, the consumption allocation chosen by agent i satisfies the collateral constraint:
Bequests. In our model, agents can prevent the disappearance of their terminal physical and financial allocations from the economy through intergenerational transfers. Thus, individuals can devolve their properties and assets upon other agents through a will . In such a testament, an agent chooses bequests that other agents will receive when he passes away.
Formally, for each i ∈ I(ξ), let
which there is at least one alive agent to be beneficiary of agent i's bequests. Also,
∅} be the set of nodes in which agent i has a positive probability to pass away in the next period.
We suppose that there is a set
in which agent i has a bequest motive that incites him to write a will in order to predetermine the distribution of his estate in case of death.
Furthermore, at any node in D i \ D i , the inheritance laws, defined below, will be applied in order to distribute agent i's estate, in case of death in the next period. Thus, due to lifetime uncertainty, an agent i can leave accidental bequests as he may accumulate savings up to a node ξ ∈ D i \ D i in order to improve his future consumption.
The amount and the distribution of bequests among the beneficiaries may positively affect agents' preferences, as will be detailed at the end of this section. Thus, unlike classical overlapping generations models, agents may be interested in buying assets at their terminal nodes.
We suppose that each agent i chooses, at each ξ ∈ D i , the rights over his future estate writing a
represents the nominal bequests that individuals
Note that wills take into account future contingencies. Moreover, at each ξ ∈ D i , agent i determines testamentary rights only among agents who are alive at this node, since he does not know the demographic structure at the successors
On the other hand, we assume that markets can enforce promises, even when borrowers are not alive. More precisely, debts are paid by agents' estate before the distribution of the testamentary rights among the beneficiaries. In addition, lenders always receive their whole expected returns, since the physical estate includes the depreciated value of collateral requirements.
Therefore, given a price process p and an allocation (x i , θ i , ϕ i ), the value of agent i's estate at
, after the payments of the debts induced by his sales at ξ ∈ D i , is given by:
The first term of the right-hand side of the previous equality represents the depreciated value of agent i's consumption that served as collateral or not. The second term represents the net returns of his portfolios. Now, to make wealth transfers consistent with the amount of estate, we suppose that when agent i writes a will at node ξ ∈ D i , the bequests
the following conditions:
where b i k (µ) denotes the amount of wealth that agent k will receive, if he is alive, at node µ and α i k (ξ) ∈ [0, 1] represents the forced shares or legitime, that is, the portion of his estate from which agent i cannot disinherit agent k.
4 Inequality (1) states that the total bequest made by an agent cannot exceed his estate. Inequality (2) conveys that the bequest that an agent k receives from agent i is greater than or equal to the minimal amount guaranteed by the forced shares.
As mentioned above, agents' preferences may be positively affected through their bequest motives, which reflect their altruism toward their descendants. More precisely, the objective function of agent i includes a function G i : given by:
++ , which is exogenously given, allows us to transform nominal bequests into real terms.
Inheritance laws. Given ξ ∈ D i , agent i's intestate estate at a node µ ∈ ξ + \ D i is defined as the amount of his estate that was not distributed after the payments of his debts and the delivery of his testamentary rights. That is,
More precisely, if agent i does not make a will at the predecessor node ξ, his intestate estate at µ ∈ ξ + \ D i is equal to the depreciated value of his wealth. Nevertheless, when agent i writes a will at ξ, his intestate estate is equal to his depreciated wealth net of the bequests that alive beneficiaries receive.
In order to avoid the disappearance of these resources from the economy and to protect agents from their (selfish) parents, we introduce a structure of inheritance laws. Formally, for each i ∈ I, the civil law jurisdictions on inheritance determine the rights that agents k ∈ I(µ) have over agent i's intestate estate at each µ ∈ ξ + \ D i , where ξ ∈ D i . These rights are given by a vector of shares 4 In civil and Roman law, the legitime, or forced share, of a decedent's estate is that portion of the estate from which he cannot disinherit his children or his wife, for instance, without sufficient legal cause. The word comes from
French héritier légitime, meaning rightful heir. Some countries adopt this system to protect the inherence of the legitime while.
Donations. We allow agents to make intra-generational transfers through donations. An individual can make gifts either for altruistic motives or to disinherit agents who will have, by law, rights over his estate when he dies.
Each agent i could be interested in make donations at nodes ξ ∈ D i −i , and has utility gains only when these transfers are received for agents in a set I −i (ξ) ⊂ I −i (ξ). In this way, we do not exclude agents who are uninterested in making donations, as some of the sets (I −i (ξ); ξ ∈ D i −i ) may be empty. In order to simplify notations we define I −i (ξ) as the empty set for nodes in
. In order to avoid that an individual receives back his donations through a chain of wealth transfers; we assume that, at each ξ ∈ D and for each n ∈ N, given a chain (i 1 , . . . , i n ) ∈ I(ξ) n :
Note that, without the condition above, an agent with monotonic preferences on donations can always improve upon any budget feasible plan, by making a donation to another agent who will, directly or indirectly, make the same amount of donation to him. Consequently, we rule out such schemes in order to guarantee that agents' maximization problems have a solution. Now, when I −i (ξ) = ∅, agent i can transfer his wealth to other individuals choosing a vector of
, where d i k (ξ) denotes the wealth that agent k receives from agent i at ξ. Let
Agent i's gains from donations are measured by a function
in such a form that, given a commodity price process p, his objective function, which depends on his consumption plan and bequest motive, also includes a term F
depends on the real amount of transfers.
Although each alive agent may know the identity of the other agents in the markets, individual allocations are anonymous. Therefore, agents are unaware of the donations they may receive, as well as their rights over the estate of deceased agents and the value of the associated intestate estate.
For this reason, we need to introduce variables representing the expected monetary transfers that agents anticipate to receive.
More precisely, we suppose that each i ∈ I takes as given, at each ξ ∈ D i , an anonymous monetary transfer s i (ξ) ∈ R + , representing the amount of wealth that he expects to receives as donations or as inheritances through wills or via civil law jurisdictions. This variable will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. Agent i's vector of monetary transfers is denoted by
5 The simplex ∆ n := {z = (z 1 , . . . , zn) ∈ R n + : Before defining the budget sets and the equilibrium of our model, let us denote agent i's set of admissible plans by Γ i , and the space of prices by P.
6 Definition 1. Given prices and anonymous monetary transfers p, q, s (1)- (2) and the following constraints:
Definition 2. An equilibrium of our economy is given by a plan of prices and anonymous transfers (p, q); (s i ) i∈I , jointly with allocations
(ii) In financial and physical markets, the aggregate demand must be equal to the aggregate supply, node by node. That is, for each ξ ∈ D,
where
6 It follows from the previous definitions that,
In addition, P :=
A. Seghir and J.P. Torres-Martínez / wealth transfers and collateral
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(iii) For each agent i ∈ I, and at each ξ ∈ D i , expected anonymous transfers must match the effective transfers that he receives. That is,
Equilibrium existence
Our first result assures the existence of an equilibrium when all agents are finitely-lived . It extends the classical Overlapping Generations model to allow for stochastic lifetimes, wealth transfers, default and, fundamentally, the access to credit markets at all states of the life span.
Theorem 1. Suppose that all agents are finitely-lived and that:
[A1] For each agent i and for each ξ ∈ D i , the accumulated endowments
[A3] For each ξ ∈ D, unitary collateral requirements C(ξ, j) = 0, for all j ∈ J(ξ);
[A4] For each agent i ∈ I, the objective function V i has finite values, is quasi-concave with respect
, continuous in all variables and strictly monotone in consumption.
Then, there is an equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The first assumption guarantees that the budget-set correspondences are lower-hemicontinuous, as their interiors will be non-empty. Indeed, as accumulated endowments are interior points of the consumption sets, agents will have positive resources, provided that commodity prices are non-zero.
Moreover, as forced heirship shares do not exhaust the entire estate of the agents, interior bequest will always be possible. Our next result shows that, when agents have at least one infinite-life path through the eventtree, Ponzi schemes can be ruled out in our economy , without need to impose any exogenous debt constraint. In particular, we extend the equilibrium existence result of Araujo, Páscoa and TorresMartínez (2002) to a model with incomplete participation and wealth transfers.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions [A1]-[A3] hold and that,
[A5] The sequence n(ξ),
, is uniformly bounded from above along the event-tree and there is v > 0 such that, for each (ξ, g) ∈ D × G, v(ξ, g) v.
[A6] For each i ∈ I, the utility function 
where u i (ξ, ·) : R G + → R + is continuous, strictly increasing and concave. Moreover, for each bounded plan x i , the associated utility, U i (x i ), is finite.
[A7] For each i ∈ I,
→ R + is continuous, non-decreasing and concave. Moreover, F i has a finite value at any bounded plan.
[A8] For each agent i,
→ R + is continuous, non-decreasing and concave. In addition, gains from bequest are finite at any bounded plan.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 1. Non-arbitrage conditions and Ponzi schemes.
When promises are backed by physical collateral, short-sales are endogenously bounded, node by node, and this is sufficient to assure equilibrium existence when agents are finitely-lived.
Nevertheless, when agents are infinitely-lived, they could enter into Ponzi schemes by increasing sequentially their loans and postponing ad-eternum the payment of their debts. However, as in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) , the "haircut", p(ξ)C(ξ, j) − q(ξ, j), will be strictly positive for each (ξ, j). 7 Thus, given prices (p, q) and monetary transfers (s i ) i∈I , each market 7 In fact, the returns of the joint financial operation of short-selling an asset and constituting the required collateral are non-negative, since borrowers will pay (or the market will seize) only the minimum between the value of the depreciated collateral and the value of the debt. Therefore, as borrowers hold and consume the collateral bundles, individual optimality assure that p(ξ)C(ξ, j) − q(ξ, j) > 0, for each (ξ, j) ∈ D(J) (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
Therefore, it follows from Assumption [A5] that there is W = (W (g); g ∈ G) ∈ R G ++ such that, any market feasible allocation satisfies the following endogenous debt constraint:
which rules out schemes consisting of a sequential increase, ad infinitum, of the debt without repayment.
On bequest and wills
In this section, we give some simple examples of bequest functions that allow us to find optimal testamentary transfers as a function of the amount of agents' estate.
We will use the following property to find optimal bequests: Given equilibrium prices and mon-
is optimal for agent i only if:
In order to simplify the examples below, we suppose that agent i is not forced by law to deliver a minimum percentage of his wealth to another agent (i.e.: α i k (ξ) = 0 for all k ∈ I −i (ξ) and ξ ∈ D i ).
Moreover, agent i's objective function is given by:
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, ρ i (ξ) ∈ (0, 1) and
Note that agent i expects to be alive at ξ with probability ρ i (ξ). In addition, the parameter η i (ξ) ∈ (0, 1) represents the probability of reaching node ξ ∈ D i and passing away in the next period. We suppose that ρ i (ξ) = 1, for each ξ ∈ D i ,
Example 1. For each ξ ∈ D i , fix an agent k(ξ) ∈ I −i (ξ) and a scalar A(ξ) > 0. If the bequest functions are given by:
then, equilibrium bequests depend on the value of the future estate.
In fact, given ξ ∈ D i , at the nodes µ ∈ ξ + \ D i in which the real value of his estate is less than or equal to A(ξ), agent i bequeaths all of his estate to agent k(ξ). On the other hand, when the real value of agent i's estate is greater than A(ξ) at µ, agent k(ξ) receives, if alive, a real bequest equal to A(ξ), while the other individuals are entitled to receive the same real transfer,
The following examples show that, when bequest functions take into account only the distribution of wealth, optimal amounts of bequest can be found as fixed shares of agents' estate.
and consider the following bequest function:
Then, in equilibrium, agent i writes a will that gives to agent k ∈ Λ(ξ), at any node µ ∈ ξ + \ D i , the following share of his estate:
In this case, the total intestate estate, at µ ∈ ξ + \ D i , is equal to
. In the particular case in which, for all pairs π(ξ, k) and consider the following bequest function:
Then, an agent k ∈ Λ(ξ) will receive a bequest from agent i,
In addition, when agent i write a will, he is indifferent between all distributions of his estate among the agents k ∈ Λ(ξ) for which π(ξ, k) = π(ξ). Thus, if there is a unique agent k ∈ Λ(ξ) such that π(ξ, k) = π(ξ), then whole estate of i is received by k, at the nodes µ ∈ ξ + \ D i in which k is alive.
About the equilibrium level of donations
In this section, we briefly comment on the optimality of the equilibrium level of donations. To simplify our analysis, we assume that the objective functions have the functional form given by equation (3) and that the functions f i ξ are concave and continuous. In addition, as in Theorem 2, the functions (u i ; i ∈ I) are supposed to be continuous, concave and strictly increasing in all variables.
In equilibrium, the optimality of agent i's allocation assures that, for each node ξ ∈ D i , with 
such that:
Thus, when agent i makes donations to k (i.e. d 
. Therefore, as a consequence of the tradeoff between consumption and altruism, although individ-
, are (globally) optimal, the equilibrium level of donations can be, in many cases, sub-optimal.
A final remark on altruistic behavior
In our model, agents may care about their descendants and, therefore, they may be interested in accumulating wealth in order to leave bequests to their offsprings. On the other hand, an individual who cares about his parents may make donations to them during his lifetime. Of course, when receiving bequests, descendants do not have any incentive to pay ancestors' debts. In fact, it is not realistic, from a pure economic point of view, to assume that descendants are urged to pay the debts of their antecedents.
However, non-economic motives may lead to altruism toward ancestors. In this case, when receiving bequests, agents may be interested in paying more than the minimum between the value of the depreciated collateral and their antecedents' debt.
If ancestors do not perfectly foresee the attitude of their descendants, the collateral cost will still be greater than the asset price. Thus, short sales will be bounded and, even when agents have at least one infinite-life path through the event-tree, Ponzi schemes are ruled out.
Nevertheless, if agents perfectly foresee that their descendants have incentives to pay more than the minimum between the value of the debt and the value of the depreciated collateral, then, unlike our model, loans may be greater than collateral costs (as the joint operation of selling an asset and constituting the required collateral will no longer have nonnegative returns). In such a case, individuals' degree of altruism toward their ancestors may act as utility penalties for default, and infinitely-lived agents may end up doing Ponzi schemes.
In fact, in a recent work, Pascoa and Seghir (2006) show that Ponzi schemes become possible in the presence of collateral and harsh utility penalties, as borrowers may pay more than the value of the depreciated collateral and the value of their debt.
Thus, in a model with collateralized assets, in which each agent perfectly foresees the altruistic behavior that his descendants have toward him when he passes away, equilibrium may still exist.
Indeed, by analogy with the results of Páscoa and Seghir (2006) , we presume that, for an equilibrium to exist, it is sufficient that some (infinitely-lived) agents are not too altruistic toward their antecedents, but the existence argument will have to be carefully redone.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 will be proved using a generalized game approach.
Without loss of generality, we assume that, at each ξ ∈ D and for each j ∈ J(ξ), there is at least one node
with m 1, we will denote by z max := max r∈{1,...,m} |zr|, the max-norm of z. Analogously, the norm of the sum will be denoted by
|zi|.
The following lemma provides a characterization of agents in terms of their donation motives and will be used to prove that individual allocations and prices are bounded in equilibrium.
where the collection of disjoint sets {I r (ξ) : 1 r n(ξ)} is defined, recursively, via,
Moreover, the set, I 1 (ξ), of agents who do not receive donations at ξ is non-empty.
Proof. By definition
Since i1 / ∈ I 1 (ξ), the set of agents i ∈ I−i 1 (ξ), with i1 ∈ I −i (ξ), is non-empty. Moreover, there is an agent i2 ∈ I−i 1 (ξ) who satisfies both i1 ∈ I −i 2 (ξ) and i2 / ∈ I 1 (ξ), since otherwise, i1 ∈ I 2 (ξ), which leads to a contradiction.
It follows that the set of agents i ∈ I−i 2 (ξ) for which i2 ∈ I −i (ξ) is also non-empty. Therefore, by analogous arguments, there is i3 ∈ I−i 2 (ξ) such that both i2 ∈ I −i 3 (ξ) and i3 / ∈ I 1 (ξ). Moreover, by
With this process, we can construct a family {i1, . . . , i n(ξ)+1 } with n(ξ) + 1 different agents that satisfies ij ∈ I −i j+1 (ξ), for each j, but this contradicts Assumption [A2], since #I(ξ) = n(ξ).
8 In fact, otherwise, independently of the value of commodity prices, asset j delivers no payments at equilibrium, and therefore, either q(ξ, j) = 0 or θ i (ξ, j) = 0, for each i ∈ I(ξ). Thus, such an asset can be eliminated from the economy, without changing the space of financial transfers.
Finally, by construction, if I r (ξ) = ∅, then I r (ξ) = ∅, for each r < r. Therefore, as
we conclude that I 1 (ξ) is a non-empty set.
The following lemma assures that individual allocations and prices are bounded in equilibrium.
Lemma 2 such that given an equilibrium (p, q); s i i∈I ;
we have:
(b) For each agent i ∈ I(ξ),
Proof. The arguments are similar to those made in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) (Lemma 1, pp. 1621). Indeed, the joint operation of short selling an asset and purchasing the associated collateral yields to nonnegative returns. So, it follows from Assumption [A4] that the financial haircut, p(ξ)C(ξ, j) − q(ξ, j), is strictly positive, for each j ∈ J(ξ) (see Proposition 1, pp. 1624, in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)).
On the other hand, as prices (p(ξ), q(ξ)) are in the simplex, we have that:
For each node ξ ∈ D, let us define C(ξ) = max , ∀ξ ∈ D.
Moreover, as the feasibility conditions in item (ii) of Definition 2 hold, individual consumption bundles are bounded, node by node, by the aggregate resources. Thus, Assumption [A3] and collateral constraints guarantee that agents' short-sales are bounded, node by node. Long positions are bounded too, due to financial market feasibility in equilibrium. So, budgetary constraints and physical-financial feasibility conditions assure that bequests are bounded, node by node, as prices (p(ξ), q(ξ)) ∈ ∆ #G+#J(ξ) .
It follows that, at each ξ ∈ D, monetary transfers received by agents in I 1 (ξ) are bounded. In fact, since these agents do not receive donations from other individuals, bequests are bounded and feasibility condition (iii) of Definition 2 holds. Thus, nominal donations made by agents in I 1 (ξ) are also bounded, as
Using recursive arguments, one can easily show that: (i) the monetary transfers received by agents in Therefore, for each ξ ∈ D, there exist (M (ξ), Ω(ξ)) 0, such that, for any i ∈ I(ξ), s i (ξ) < M (ξ) and
The game G. In order to prove the equilibrium existence, we introduce a game and we show that (i) this game always has a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium and (ii) each Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium for our economy.
The generalized game G that we consider is characterized by:
• A set of players. There is a countable set of players constituted by:
(i) The set of agents, i ∈ I, of the original economy,
(ii) A player h(ξ) for each node ξ ∈ D,
To shorten notations below, we denote the set of players by
, where the set
• Strategies.
(i) For each player h ∈ I, the set of strategies, Γ h , is given by the collection of plans
For simplicity, let Finally, let Γ = h∈H Γ h be the space of strategies of the game G, in which a generic element is denoted by (p, q, s, η).
• Admissible strategies. The strategies that can be effectively chosen for a player h ∈ H may depend on the actions taken by the other agents, through a correspondence of admissible strategies Φ h : Γ −h Γ h , where
Thus, denoting by (p, q, s, η) −h a generic element of Γ −h , we suppose that:
that satisfy the budget set restrictions at nodes ξ ∈ D h , at prices (p, q), given the monetary transfers
• Objective functions. Each player h ∈ H is also characterized by his objective function, denoted by
For each h ∈ H, we define the correspondence of optimal strategies as follows:
Definition 3. A Nash equilibrium for the game G is a plan of strategies (p, q, s, η) ∈ Γ such that (p, q, s, η) ∈ Ψ(p, q, s, η). Aliprantis and Border (1999) Aliprantis and Border (1999) ) that, for each h ∈ H, the correspondence of optimal strategies, Ψ h , is upper-hemicontinuous with non-empty, convex and compact values.
Thus, the correspondence Ψ has non-empty and convex values in the product topology of Γ. Since ∀h ∈ H, Ψ h has a closed graph, then Ψ is also closed. Moreover, it follows from Tychonoff's Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999) ) that Ψ has compact values. Applying Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem to Ψ, we conclude the proof.
Finally, Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of the following result:
, a Nash equilibrium for G is an equilibrium of our original economy.
Proof. Let us fix a Nash equilibrium (p, q, s, η). It follows from the definition of M (ξ) (see proof of Lemma 2) that, for each pair (ξ, k) ∈ I(D), one has:
Thus, since for each h = i ∈ I, the collection
follows from the inequality above and the physical-financial budget constraints that:
As the left-hand side of equation (5) represents the objective function of player h = h(ξ0), its optimal value is less than or equal to zero. Thus,
Then, it follows from the proof of Lemma 2 that x i (ξ0, g) < Ω(ξ0), for each g ∈ G. Moreover, collateral constraints assure that the short sales satisfy ϕ i (ξ0, j) < Ω(ξ0), for all j ∈ J(ξ0). Therefore, strict monotonicity of u i implies that, for each asset j ∈ J(ξ0), p(ξ0)C(ξ, j) − q(ξ0, j) > 0. So, we guarantee that ||p(ξ0)||Σ > m(ξ0).
Now, it follows from the monotonicity of agents' objective functions that inequality (5) holds as an equality and that, i∈I(ξ 0 ) θ i (ξ0) − ϕ i (ξ0) 0, which guarantees that θ i (ξ0, j) < Ω(ξ0), for each asset j ∈ J(ξ0).
Furthermore, Assumption [A4] assures that p(ξ0) 0. Thus, physical market feasibility holds at ξ0. In addition, the monotonicity of the preferences guarantees that financial markets clear, at the initial node.
The same arguments can be applied to prove that financial markets clear at each ξ > ξ0 (using equation (6) and the market feasibility at ξ − ). Thus, a Nash equilibrium of the game G satisfies feasibility conditions of items (ii) and (iii) of Definition 2.
On the other side, the definition of Nash equilibrium guarantees that, for each agent i ∈ I, the plan η i ∈ B i (p, q, s i ) and
Finally, as D i is a finite set and
< Ω(ξ), for each ξ ∈ D i , the quasi-
which assures the optimality of individual allocations on the budget set.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2.
Let I := {i ∈ I : #D i = +∞ } be the set of infinitely-lived agents in the economy.
For each T ∈ N, T 3, let us consider an abstract economy, E T , populated by I finitely-lived agents, where each i ∈ I is replaced by an agent who has a maximal lifetime of T . Thus, we suppose that, for each i ∈ I, the associated agent, also denoted by i, is alive only at nodes in D i,T :=
When we make this truncation, it is possible that, depending on the original demographic structure, some nodes of D disappear from the abstract economy E T . In fact, the set of nodes in which agents trade commodities and assets will be given by
However, for our purposes, we only need the set D T to be, asymptotically, equal to the original event-tree In this context, the set of agents who are alive at node ξ ∈ D T is given by I(ξ, T ) := {i ∈ I(ξ) : ξ ∈ D i,T }.
Analogously, given i ∈ I, we define the following sets:
I−i(ξ, T ) = I−i(ξ) ∩ I(ξ, T ), ∀i ∈ I(ξ, T ), I −i (ξ, T ) = I −i (ξ) ∩ I(ξ, T ), ∀i ∈ I(ξ, T ),
Thus, in E T , agent i ∈ I can make bequests only at the first T − 1 periods of his life span. Moreover, given ξ ∈ D, if T t(ξ) then I(ξ, T ) = I(ξ) and, therefore, I−i(ξ, T ) = I−i(ξ) and I −i (ξ, T ) = I −i (ξ).
In the truncated economy E T , agent i receives monetary transfers s i,T := (s i,T (ξ); ξ ∈ D i,T ) and, given prices (p, q), he can choose any plan in the truncated budget set, 
